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Abstract
Using Mart´ın Escardo´’s effectful forcing technique, we give a new and elegant
proof of a well-known result: the constructive validity of Brouwer’s monotone Bar
Theorem for any System T-definable bar [22]. We have not assumed any non-
constructive (Classical or Brouwerian) principles in this proof, and have carried
out the entire development formally in the Agda proof assistant [17] for Martin-
Lo¨f’s Constructive Type Theory.
In 2013, Mart´ın Escardo´ pioneered a technique called “effectful forcing” for demon-
strating non-constructive (Brouwerian) principles for the definable functionals of Go¨del’s
SystemT [7], including the continuity of functionals on the Baire space and uniform
continuity of functionals on the Cantor space. Effectful forcing is a remarkably sim-
pler alternative to standard sheaf-theoretic forcing arguments, using ideas from pro-
gramming languages, including computational effects, monads and logical relations.
Following a suggestion from Thierry Coquand [2, 3], the author learnt that Brouwer’s
controversial Bar Theorem can be validated in a Beth model (or, more generally, a
sheaf topos) by instantiating the premise of barhood at a “generic point”, which would
yield an inductive mental construction of barhood. In this paper, we put an analogous
version of this idea into practice using Escardo´’s method.
Notation I find it useful to reflect the modes of mathematical statements and judg-
ments using colors, where blue indicates an input to a statement, and red indicates an
output (something that is synthesized).
1 Brouwer’s Bar Thesis
There are many versions of the Bar Thesis and its corollary, the bar induction principle
(see Section 1.1), but we will describe here a particularly perspicuous one. First we will
define a point-free notion of topological space called a “spread”.
Finite sequences For any set X, let X? be the set of finite sequences or lists ~u of ele-
ments of X. We will write ~u_x for the list got by appending x ∈ X to the list ~u ∈ X?,
and x :: ~u for the list got by prepending x ∈ X to ~u ∈ X?. Let α,β range over infinite
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Figure 1: A visualization of when the monotone speciesQ ⊆ S is a bar, i.e. 〈〉 / Q. The
dotted line represents where the bar begins, and α is an arbitrary choice sequence in
the spread; α [kα] is the first prefix of αwhich is inQ.
sequencesXN; we write α [k] ∈ X? for finite sequence which is the first k elements of
α, x :: α ∈ XN for the infinite sequence got by prepending x ∈ X, and ~u A α ∈ XN
for the infinite sequence got by prepending ~u ∈ X?. Finally, write |~u| for the length of
~u ∈ X?.
Spreads A spread consists in a set S ⊆ N? of finite sequences (nodes) ~u ∈ N? such
that the following hold:
〈〉 ∈ S
~u ∈ S
∃x ∈ N. ~u_x ∈ S
~u ∈ S ~v 4 ~u
~v ∈ S
Viewed as a topological space, the admitted finite sequences are the spread’s open
sets (neighborhoods), and its points are the infinite sequences α ∈ NN whose every
prefix ~u ≺ α is admitted. The topology of a spread is given by the notion of a “bar”
(analogous to a formal “cover”).
In Intuitionistic mathematics, a subset or predicate is usually called a species; we
will uphold that terminology.
Bars on a spread We say that a species of nodes Q ⊆ S bars a node ~u when every
infinite sequence out of ~u has a prefix inQ. Formally, we define:
~u / Q , ∀α  ~u. ∃k ∈ N. α [k] ∈ Q (1)
When Q bars the root node, i.e. 〈〉 / Q, we simply say that Q is a bar; this state of
affairs is presented visually in Figure 1.
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Inductive definition of bars A speciesQ is called monotone when, if ~u ∈ Q, we also
have~u_x ∈ Q for anyx ∈ N. Separately, we define an inductive version of the barhood
relation for a monotone species of nodesQ, defined as the least relation closed under
the two rules of inference in Figure 2. This version of barhood is visualized as a tree in
Figure 3.
~u J Q presupposing ~u ∈ S , Q ⊆ S , Qmonotone
~u ∈ Q
~u J Q
η
∀x ∈ { x ∈ N | ~u_x ∈ S }. ~u_x J Q
~u J Q z
Figure 2: Brouwer’s definition of barhood.
Theorem 1.1. AssumingQ is monotone, Brouwer’s ζ inference is admissible:
~u J Q
~u_x J Q ζ
Proof. By case on the premise. If the premise was η, then by monotonicity of Q and
η. Otherwise, if the premise wasz, then we have for any y ∈ N, ~u_y J Q. Choose
y ≡ x.
Theorem 1.2. The inductive relation ~u J Q is a sound characterization of barhood: from
~u J Qwe may conclude ~u / Q.
Proof. We have to show that for any α  ~u, there exists a k ∈ N such that α [k] ∈
Q. In fact, it suffices to show that for any α  〈〉, there exists a k ∈ N such that
~u A α [|~u|+ k] ∈ Q. We proceed by cases on the premise.
If the premise was η, then choose k ≡ 0. Otherwise, if the premise was z, then
we have for all x ∈ N, ~u_x / Q; by our inductive hypothesis, for any x ∈ N and
β  〈〉, we have a k ′ ∈ N such that ~u_x A β [|~u|+ 1+ k ′] ∈ Q. Let x ≡ head(α)
and β ≡ tail(α); then choose k ≡ k ′ + 1.
Proposition 1.3 (Brouwer’s Bar Thesis). Brouwer’s (monotone) Bar Thesis states that for any
monotone speciesQ ⊆ S, the inductive definition of barhood is also complete: from ~u / Q we
may conclude ~u J Q.
Instantiated at the Baire spreadB ≡ {~u | ~u ∈ N? } (also called the universal spread),
Proposition 1.3 becomes the standard statement of Brouwer’s Bar Thesis; at the Cantor
spread C ≡ {~u | ~u ∈ 2? }, it proves the Fan Theorem. In what follows, we will work
only with the universal spread B without loss of generality.
Stated as above, Proposition 1.3 for the Baire and Cantor spreads is consistent with
constructive foundations, but is not constructively valid. There is a computational
procedure called “bar recursion” to witness the validity of the completeness rule above,
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Figure 3: A visualization of the inductive characterization of barhood 〈〉 J Q for a
monotone species Q ⊆ C in the Cantor spread C , 2?, whose points are infinite
sequences of bits. (Compare with Figure 1.) In the depicted tree, each node is labeled
with the finite sequence of bits that it codes; to be precise, a node labeledη~u represents
a proof of ~u J Q which is a leaf node, and a node labeled z~u represents a proof of
~u J Q which is a branching node.
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but the recognition of its effectiveness depends crucially on the assumption of the Bar
Thesis itself.
As far as computational realizations of constructive foundations are concerned, then,
this places the Bar Thesis at the same level as other axioms such as Markov’s Principle
and Church’s Thesis, whose effectiveness can be assumed without disturbing the com-
putational character of the framework, but for which it is a trivial matter to exhibit a
countermodel.
1.1 The Bar Induction Principle
In most of the relevant literature, Brouwer’s Thesis is usually considered not in the
form given in Proposition 1.3, but equivalently as the following induction principle.
Definition 1.4 (Monotone Bar Induction Principle). The monotone bar induction principle
BImono says that for a species R ⊆ N? of nodes and a monotone bar 〈〉 / Q, if we can conclude
〈〉 ∈ R from the following conditions:
1. Base case: R includes the bar, i.e.Q ⊆ R.
2. Inductive step: We have ~u ∈ R if for all x ∈ N, ~u_x ∈ R. This condition is often called
upwards heredity.
Theorem 1.5. The monotone bar induction principle BImono (Definition 1.4) is equivalent to
Brouwer’s Bar Thesis (Proposition 1.3).
Proof. (⇒) Fix a monotone bar 〈〉 / Q and define R , {~u | ~u J Q }. By the BImono
principle, it suffices to show the following:
1. Base case: We need to show that if ~u ∈ Q then ~u ∈ R, which is to say, ~u J Q;
but this is just the η inference.
2. Inductive step: the upwards heredity of R amounts to exactly thez inference.
(⇐) Fix a monotone bar ~u / Q and a species R ⊇ Qwhich is hereditary upwards.
By Proposition 1.3, we have some ~u J Q; proceed by induction on this tree:
Case η. Then ~u ∈ B, whence ~u ∈ R.
Casez. Then for any x ∈ N, we have ~u_x J Q; by induction, we have ~u_x ∈ R for
all x ∈ N. By upwards heredity of R, we have ~u ∈ R.
Then, instantiate ~u ≡ 〈〉.
There is another version of the Bar Induction principle calledBIdec, which replaces
monotonicity of the bar with decidability. In the literature,BIdec seems to get the most
attention, but we view monotonicity to be a more fundamental characteristic than de-
cidability: monotonicity is what distinguishes judgment (i.e. acts of knowledge) from
merely procedural activity of the Intuitionistic subject [15]. From our point of view, de-
cidability is on the contrary a fairly arbitrary property, and depends less on the math-
ematical characteristics of an object than on its coding.
From an axiomatic point of view, however, BIdec may be of interest, because it is
weaker than BImono, as we can see in Theorem 1.6, which is due to Dummett [6].
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Lemma 1.1. Any bar 〈〉 / Q can be freely made into a monotone bar 〈〉 / Q ′.
Proof. For a concrete proof of this fact, the reader is referred to Dummett [6]; we prefer
to give a conceptual proof, where the development of the monotone bar is guided using
a free construction (i.e. one which is left adjoint to a forgetful functor).
A monotone species can viewed as a presheaf on the posetN?. Letting |N?| be the
poset of finite sequences of natural numbers under the discrete ordering, we have an
obvious inclusion i : |N?|→ N?, and thence the reindexing functor i∗ : N̂? → |̂N?| by
precomposition.
By the left Kan extension, this reindexing functor has a left adjoint, i! , Lani∗(−) a
i∗; calculating this extension pointwise, we have i!(Q) : N̂? = {~u | ∃~v 4 ~u.~v ∈ Q },
which is clearly also a bar whenQ : |̂N?| is a bar.
Theorem 1.6. From BImono we can conclude BIdec.
Proof. Fix a decidable bar 〈〉 / Q and species R ⊇ Q which is hereditary upwards;
we need to show that 〈〉 ∈ R. By Lemma 1.1, we have can exhibit a monotone bar
Q ′ , i!Q.
Next, define a new motive of induction, R ′ , {~u | ~u ∈ R∨ ~u ∈ Q ′ }. In order to
apply the BImono principle, we need to show the following:
1. Base case: clearlyQ ′ ⊆ R ′.
2. Inductive step: we can show that R ′ is hereditary upwards. Suppose that for all
x ∈ N, we have ~u_x ∈ R ′; we need to show that ~u ∈ R ′. BecauseQ andQ ′ are
decidable, we can proceed by case on whether ~u ∈ Q ′.
Case ~u ∈ Q ′. Automatically, we have ~u ∈ R ′.
Case ~u 6∈ Q ′. Unfolding definitions, this means that there does not exist any
~v 4 ~u such that~v ∈ Q. Therefore, by decidability ofQ, we are justified in con-
cluding ~u_x ∈ Q from ~u_x ∈ Q ′. From the base case of theBIdec premise, we
know that ~u_x ∈ R, and then from the upwards heredity ofR, we can conclude
~u ∈ R. By definition, we have ~u ∈ R ′.
From the above, we can conclude 〈〉 ∈ R ′, which means that either 〈〉 ∈ R or
〈〉 ∈ Q ′. In the latter case, we clearly have 〈〉 ∈ Q, whence by the base case for BIdec
we have 〈〉 ∈ R.
2 Go¨del’s SystemT as a theory of constructions
In his famous Dialectica interpretation [11], Kurt Go¨del introduced SystemT to serve
as a formal theory of constructions for Heyting arithmetic, which we briefly reproduce
in modern form in Figure 4.
A constructive interpretation of first-order logic can be given by interpreting the
logical connectives as predicates on SystemT terms. Then, it is possible to say what it
means for a formula (such as ~u / Q) to be valid relative to SystemT.
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ι atype σ type Γ ctx Γ `M : σ presupposing Γ ctx , σ type
nat atype
ι atype
ι type
σ type τ type
σ→ τ type seq , nat→ nat (Types)
· ctx
Γ ctx σ type
Γ , x : σ ctx
(x /∈ Γ)
(Contexts)
Γ , x : σ,∆ ` x : σ var Γ ` z : nat zero
Γ ` m : nat
Γ ` s(m) : nat succ (Terms)
Γ , x : nat,y : σ ` s[x,y] : σ Γ ` z : σ Γ ` n : nat
Γ ` recσ([x,y].s[x,y]; z;n) : σ
rec
Γ , x : σ ` m[x] : τ
Γ ` λx.m[x] : σ→ τ lam
Γ ` m : σ→ τ Γ ` n : σ
Γ ` m •σ n : τ
ap
Figure 4: Syntax and typing rules of SystemT, formulated in λ-calculus style.
We do not in this paper pursue the formal development of such a realizability in-
terpretation; however, in Section 4 we will propose a version of barhood~u /T Qwhich
captures precisely what it should mean for ~u / Q to be true for a bar that is coded in
SystemT.
3 Denotational semantics of SystemT
We will now proceed to develop two denotational semantics for System T: a “stan-
dard” semantics and an interactive “dialogue” semantics; then we will prove that the
two are coherent using a logical relations argument. This procedure is entirely due to
Escardo´ [7]. Both semantics share the interpretation V [ι] of the atomic types ι atype,
as follows:
V [nat] , N (2)
3.1 Standard semantics of SystemT
The standard semantics V JσK for the types σ type is as follows:
V JιK , V [ι]
V Jσ→ τK , V JσK→ V JτK
Contexts Γ ctx are interpreted as environments G JΓK:
G JΓK , ∏
x∈|Γ |
V JΓ(x)K
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Jx : σKρ , ρ(x)Jz : natKρ , 0Js(m) : natKρ , 1+ Jm : natKρ
Jrecσ([x,y].s[x,y]; z;n) : σKρ , Rec
 (a,b) 7→ Js[x,y] : σKρ,x 7→a,y7→b ,Jz : σKρ ,Jn : natKρ

Jλx.m[x] : σ→ τKρ , a 7→ Jm[x] : τKρ,x 7→aJm •σ n : τKρ , Jm : σ→ τKρ Jn : σKρ
where
Rec(s, z, 0) , z
Rec(s, z,n+ 1) , s(n,Rec(s, z,n))
Figure 5: The interpretation of SystemT terms in our standard semantics.
The interpretation of terms Jm : σKρ ∈ V JσK for ρ ∈ G JΓK, presupposing Γ `
m : σ, is entirely straightforward. We summarize it in Figure 5.
3.2 Escardo´ dialogues: ideal codes for functionals
First, let us define the set EXY (Z) of “Escardo´ dialogues”, which code functionals of
type YX → Z, as the least set closed under the rules in Figure 6.
EXY (−) : Set→ Set
z ∈ Z
η(z) ∈ EXY (Z)
return x ∈ X e ∈ Y → E
X
Y (Z)
β〈x〉(e) ∈ EXY (Z)
query
Figure 6: Rules for constructing Escardo´ dialogues.
An Escardo´ dialogue is an idealized procedure or algorithm for computing a func-
tional; leaf nodes η(z) return a result z, and branch nodes β〈x〉(e) query for the xth
element y of the input choice sequence and proceed with e(y). Such interactions are
essentially a hyper-intensional, syntactic representation of a neighborhood function.
EXY (−) is a monad on Set, natural in X, Y ∈ Set. We define the action E(f) ∈
EXY (A)→ EXY (B) of the functor as follows for f ∈ A→ B:
E(f) ∈ EXY (A)→ EXY (B)
E(f)(η(a)) , η(f(a))
E(f)(β〈x〉(e)) , β〈x〉(E(f) ◦ e)
8
η is the unit of the monad; we define the Kleisli extension f? ∈ EXY (A)→ EXY (B) for
f ∈ A→ EXY (B) as follows:
f? ∈ EXY (A)→ EXY (B)
f?(η(a)) , f(a)
f?(β〈x〉(e)) , β〈x〉(f? ◦ e)
An Escardo´ dialogue e ∈ EXY (Z)may be executed on a choice sequence α ∈ YX to
return a result e  α ∈ Z as follows:
− − ∈ EXY (Z)× YX → Z
η(z)  α , z
β〈x〉(e)  α , e(α(x))  α
The following two lemmas are from Escardo´ [7].
Lemma 3.1. For anyα ∈ YX, the execution map−  α is a natural transformationEXY (−)→ 1Set:
EXY (A) E
X
Y (B)
A B
E(f)
−α −α
f
Proof. Immediate by induction on the dialogue tree.
Lemma 3.2. Kleisli extension commutes with execution, in the following sense:
EXY (A) E
X
Y (B)
A EXY (B) B
f?
−α −α
f −α
Proof. Immediate by induction on the dialogue tree.
3.3 Interactive semantics of SystemT
Now we are prepared to begin interpreting well-typed System T terms into Escardo´
dialogues. The semantic domains are as follows:
V 〈〈ι〉〉 , ENN(V [ι])
V 〈〈σ→ τ〉〉 , V 〈〈σ〉〉 → V 〈〈τ〉〉
G 〈〈Γ〉〉 ,
∏
x∈|Γ |
V 〈〈Γ(x)〉〉
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〈〈x : σ〉〉ρ , ρ(x)
〈〈z : nat〉〉ρ , η(0)
〈〈s(m) : nat〉〉ρ , E(1+−) 〈〈m : nat〉〉ρ
〈〈recσ([x,y].s[x,y]; z;n) : σ〉〉ρ , Rec
 (a,b) 7→ 〈〈s[x,y] : σ〉〉ρ,x 7→a,y7→b,〈〈z : σ〉〉ρ,
−
~
σ
〈〈n : nat〉〉ρ
〈〈λx.m[x] : σ→ τ〉〉ρ , a 7→ 〈〈m[x] : τ〉〉ρ,x 7→a
〈〈m •σ n : τ〉〉ρ , 〈〈m : σ→ τ〉〉ρ 〈〈n : σ〉〉ρ
Figure 7: The interpretation of SystemT terms into dialogues.
We will need to lift the Kleisli extension (−)? to apply at higher type; for a type
σ type and a map f ∈ X→ V 〈〈σ〉〉, we have the lifted Kleisli extension f~σ ∈ ENN(X)→ V 〈〈σ〉〉,
defined as follows:
f~σ ∈ ENN(X)→ V 〈〈σ〉〉
f~ι (d) , f?(d)
f~σ→τ(d) , s 7→ f(−, s)~τ (d)
The interpretation 〈〈m : σ〉〉ρ ∈ V 〈〈σ〉〉 for an environment ρ ∈ G 〈〈Γ〉〉, presup-
posing Γ ` m : σ, is essentially a monadic or “effectful” version of the standard inter-
pretation given in Figure 5; we summarize the dialogue interpretation in Figure 7.
3.4 Coherence of interpretations
The standard semantics and the interactive semantics cohere for closed terms of atomic
type ι atype in the sense that the following diagram commutes for any α ∈ NN:
· ` ι
V 〈〈ι〉〉 V JιK
〈〈− : ι〉〉 J− : ιK
−  α
(3)
In order to prove this, we will need to actually prove a stronger lemma for open
terms at higher type using logical relations. Logical relations, also known as Tait’s method
or the method of computability, is a technique in which a predicate on closed terms at
base type is extended uniformly over open terms at higher type. As with our current
situation, usually the theorem that one wants to prove has to do with only closed terms
of base type; however, in order to prove such a thing by induction, it is necessary to
strengthen the motive in this way.
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v Rασ d presupposing α ∈ NN , σ type , v ∈ V JσK , d ∈ V 〈〈σ〉〉
ρ0 R
α
Γ ρ1 presupposing α ∈ NN , Γ ctx , ρ0 ∈ G JΓK , ρ1 ∈ G 〈〈Γ〉〉
v = d  α
v Rαι d
∀v ∈ V JσK, e ∈ V 〈〈σ〉〉. v Rασ e =⇒ f(v) Rατ d(e)
f Rασ→τ d
∀x ∈ |Γ |. ρ0(x) RαΓ(x) ρ1(x)
ρ0 R
α
Γ ρ1
Figure 8: Definition of the logical relations between our two interpretations.
We define our logical relationRασ forα ∈ NN between the (values, environments)
of each interpretation in Figure 8. It will be useful to prove an auxiliary lemma about
(−)~σ , following [7].
Lemma 3.3. Fix ι atype, σ type, f ∈ V [ι]→ V JσK, d ∈ V [ι]→ V 〈〈σ〉〉, v ∈ V [ι], and
e ∈ V 〈〈ι〉〉. Then, we may infer:
v Rαι e ∀k ∈ V [ι]. f(k) Rασ d(k)
f(v) Rασ d
~
σ (e)
Proof. By induction on σ type. If σ is atomic, then our goal holds by Lemma 3.2; other-
wise, by the inductive hypothesis.
Theorem 3.1. The standard and interactive interpretations of each SystemT-definable term
are related by R, assuming environments related by R. More precisely, for any Γ ` M : σ,
ρ0 ∈ G JΓK and ρ1 ∈ G 〈〈Γ〉〉 such that ρ0 RαΓ ρ1, we have JM : σKρ0 Rασ 〈〈M : σ〉〉ρ1 .
Proof. By case on the termM.
CaseM ≡ x : σ. Because ρ0 RαΓ ρ1, we also have ρ0(x) Rασ ρ1(x).
CaseM ≡ recσ([x,y].s[x,y]; z;n) : σ. Let us begin with some auxiliary definitions:
S0 , (a,b) 7→ Js : σKρ0,x 7→a,y7→b
S1 , (a,b) 7→ 〈〈s : σ〉〉ρ1,x 7→a,y7→b
Z0 , Jz : σKρ0 Z1 , 〈〈z : σ〉〉ρ1
N0 , Jn : natKρ0 N1 , 〈〈n : nat〉〉ρ1
R0 , Rec(S0,Z0,−) R1 , Rec(S1 ◦ η,Z1,−)
By backward chaining through Lemma 3.3, letting ι ≡ nat, f ≡ R0, d ≡ R1, v ≡ N0
and e ≡ N1, it suffices to show the following:
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1. N0 Rαnat N1: by the inductive hypothesis for n.
2. For any k ∈ N, R0(k) Rασ R1(k): by induction on k, applying the inductive
hypotheses for z and s in the base case and inductive step respectively.
All remaining cases follow from their inductive hypotheses and Lemma 3.1.
Corollary 3.1. Diagram 3 commutes for any ι atype andα ∈ NN.
Proof. By Theorem 3.1, instantiated at the type ι and the empty environment.
4 Validity of the Bar Thesis forT-definable bars
Recall the definition of a bar from Section 1 (Equation 1):
~u / Q , ∀α  ~u. ∃k ∈ N. α [k] ∈ Q
It is well-known that we cannot hope to prove the Bar Thesis (Proposition 1.3) for
this definition of barhood, but our experience with the interactive semantics of Sys-
tem T suggests that we might prove a slightly weaker rule, by requiring the premise
to be realized by a SystemT-definable functional.
If we interpret the quantifiers constructively and functionally, this is the same as
to say that we have a functional · ` f : seq→ nat which computes the length of an
approximation that is in the bar (recall from Figure 4 that seq , nat→ nat). To apply
such a functional to a meta-level choice sequence, let us exploit the standard semantics
defined in Section 3.1:
f 〈α〉 , Jf : seq→ natK (α)
Now, we can define a new SystemT-centric notion of barhood:
~u /T Q , ∃ · ` f : seq→ nat. ∀α  〈〉. ~u A α [f 〈α〉+ |~u|] ∈ Q
Proposition 4.1 (Bar Thesis for SystemT). The Bar Thesis for SystemT states that for any
monotone species Q ⊆ B of nodes in the Baire spread, the inductive definition of barhood is
complete in the sense that we can conclude ~u J Q from ~u /T Q.
4.1 Brouwer’s ephemeral dialogues
The content of Brouwer’s purported (but failed) proof of his Bar Thesis was to assert
that one can analyze the evidence for barhood into a well-founded mental construc-
tion [24, 6]; Escardo´’s translation of SystemT terms into dialogue trees is essentially
a formalization of Brouwer’s insight.
However, Escardo´’s dialogues differ from Brouwer’s mental constructions of bar-
hood, which are captured precisely by the judgment ~u J Q, in one crucial respect:
whereas Escardo´’s trees branch on an arbitrary query to the ambient choice sequence,
queries in Brouwer’s mental constructions must be made in order, i.e. with respect to
the current moment in ideal time; moreover, the Brouwerian dialogues are ephemeral—
with each query, the head of the ambient choice sequence is consumed and the re-
mainder of the dialogue is interpreted with respect to the tail of the choice sequence.
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Our task, then, will be to normalize Escardo´’s dialogues into Brouwer’s ephemeral
mental constructions, and then show how to massage these into a derivation of ~u J
Q. Below we define the set of Brouwerian dialoguesBY(Z) (coding functionalsYN →
Z) as the least set closed under the rules in Figure 9.
BY(−) : Set→ Set z ∈ ZηB(z) ∈ BY(Z) spit
b ∈ Y → BY(Z)
z(b) ∈ BY(Z) bite
Figure 9: Rules for forming Brouwerian ephemeral dialogues; compare with the in-
ductive barhood judgment ~u J Q in Figure 2.
We will design an inductive/proof-theoretic characterization of the normalizable
Escardo´ dialogues, and then show that all Escardo´ dialogues can be coded as such.
This yields a constructive and structurally recursive normalization algorithm.
To this end, we define below two mutually inductive forms of judgment, whose
rules are given in Figure 10:
1. ~u  d  b, presupposing ~u ∈ Y? and d ∈ ENY(Z), and guaranteeing b ∈
BY(Z), means that the Escardo´ dialogue d normalizes to the Brouwerian dia-
logue b.
2. ~u  β〈i〉 (d) ~v b presupposes ~u,~v ∈ Y?, i ∈ N and d ∈ Y → ENY(Z), and
guarantees b ∈ BY(Z). This auxiliary form of judgment can be thought of as
searching for the appropriate moment to insert a query to the oracle.
Lemma 4.1. The inductive characterization of normalization ~u  d b is functional, i.e. for
any ~u ∈ Y? andd ∈ ENY(Z)we can exhibit some unique b ∈ BY(Z) such that ~u  d b.
Proof. Simultaneously, we must also show that ~u  β〈i〉 (d)  ~v  b is functional.
We will begin with ~u  d b, proceeding by case on d ∈ ENY(Z).
Case d ≡ η(z). By normη, we have b ≡ ηB(z).
Case d ≡ β〈i〉(e). By induction, we have ~u  β〈i〉 (e) ~u b; apply normβ.
Next, we tackle ~u  β〈i〉 (d)  ~v  b by simultaneous induction on ~v ∈ Y?
(viewed as a cons-list) and i ∈ N.
Case~v ≡ 〈〉, i ≡ 0. By induction, we have ~u_y  d(y) b(y) for any y ∈ Y; apply
norm〈〉,zβ .
Case~v ≡ 〈〉, i ≡ j+ 1. By induction, we have ~u_y  β〈j〉 (d)  〈〉  b(y) for any
y ∈ Y; apply norm〈〉,sβ .
Case~v ≡ y :: w, i ≡ 0. By induction, we have ~u  d(y) b; apply norm::,zβ .
Case~v ≡ y :: w, i ≡ j+ 1. By induction, we have ~u  β〈j〉 (d)  ~v  b; apply
norm::,sβ .
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~u  d b presupposing ~u ∈ Y? , d ∈ ENY(Z) , b ∈ BY(Z)
~u  β〈i〉 (d) ~v b presupposing ~u,~v ∈ Y? , i ∈ N , d ∈ Y → ENY(Z) , b ∈ BY(Z)
~u  η(z) ηB(z)
normη
~u  β〈i〉 (d) ~u b
~u  β〈i〉(d) b normβ
~u  d(y) b
~u  β〈0〉 (d) y :: ~v b norm
::,z
β
~u  β〈i〉 (d) ~v b
~u  β〈i+ 1〉 (d) y :: ~v b norm
::,s
β
∀y ∈ Y. ~u_y  d(y) b(y)
~u  β〈0〉 (d) 〈〉 z(b) norm
〈〉,z
β
∀y ∈ Y. ~u_y  β〈i〉 (d) 〈〉 b(y)
~u  β〈i+ 1〉 (d) 〈〉 z(b) norm
〈〉,s
β
Figure 10: Rules for dialogue normalization.
Corollary 4.1 (Normalization Algorithm). We have a structurally recursive functionnorm~u(d)
such that for all ~u ∈ Y? and d ∈ ENY(Z), ~u  d norm~u(d).
Proof. This is the constructive content of Lemma 4.1.
4.2 Execution Semantics forBY(Z)
Just as we showed how to execute an Escardo´ dialogue against a choice sequence in
Section 3.2, we can do the same for the Brouwerian, ephemeral version. For b ∈
BY(Z) and α ∈ YN, we define b B α ∈ Z by recursion on b as follows:
− B − ∈ BY(Z)× YN → Z
ηB(z) B α , z
z(b) B α , b(head(α)) B tail(α)
Lemma 4.2. Execution of dialogues coheres with normalization, as defined in Corollary 4.1; to
be precise, the following diagram commutes for all ~u ∈ Y? andα ∈ YN.
ENY(Z) BY(Z)
Z
norm~u(−)
−  ~u A α − B α (4)
When ~u ≡ 〈〉, this becomes the statement that−  α = − B α ◦ norm (−).
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Proof. We have to show that for any ~u ∈ Y?, α ∈ YN and d ∈ ENY(Z), we have
d  ~u A α = norm~u(d) B α. This follows by straightforward induction on the nor-
malization of d.
We can compose Diagrams 3, 4 to see a birds’ view of the state of affairs concerning
interpretation, normalization and execution. For any ι atype and α ∈ YN, the follow-
ing diagram commutes:
· ` ι V [ι]
ENY(V [ι]) BY(V [ι])
J− : ιK
〈〈− : ι〉〉 −  α
norm (−)
− B α (5)
4.3 The Generic Point
In the dialogue model, we can define a so-called “generic point” which is not definable
in SystemT:
generic ∈ EXY (X)→ EXY (Y)
generic , (β〈−〉(η))?
In particular, note that we have generic ∈ V 〈〈nat→ nat〉〉. Intuitively, by apply-
ing the dialogue interpretation of a functional · ` φ : seq→ nat to this generic point,
we get a dialogue tree 〈〈φ : seq→ nat〉〉(generic) ∈ V 〈〈nat〉〉 ≡ ENN(N) which is pre-
cisely the trace ofφ’s interaction with the ambient choice sequence. Then, assuming
that φ witnesses ~u /T Q, we can compute the derivation of ~u J Q by induction on
this trace.
Lemma 4.3. The generic point commutes with dialogue execution in the following sense:
EXY (X) E
X
Y (Y)
X Y
generic
−  α −  α
α
Proof. Immediate by induction on the dialogue tree.
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4.4 Brouwer’s Bar Theorem
We may now prove the Bar Theorem for SystemT-definable bars.
Theorem 4.2 (Proposition 4.1). For any monotone species Q ⊆ B of nodes in the Baire
spread, we can conclude ~u J Q from ~u /T Q.
Proof. By inversion on the premise, we must have some · ` f : seq→ nat such that for
allα  〈〉, we know~u A α [Jf : seq→ natK α+ |~u|] ∈ Q. Letd , 〈〈f : seq→ nat〉〉(generic)
andb , norm (d); then, by coercing along Diagram 5 and Lemma 4.3, we have a proof
P(α) that ~u A α [b B α+ |~u|] ∈ Q. We proceed by induction on b ∈ BN(N).
Case b ≡ ηB(0). In this case, we are already in the bar. Let 0 · · · be the choice se-
quence α(i) , 0; from P(0 · · · ), we know ~u A 0 · · · [0+ |~u|] ∈ Q, which is the same
as ~u ∈ Q; therefore, apply η. Note that the choice of 0 · · · was completely arbitrary,
since at this stage, we have stopped consuming from the choice sequence.
Case b ≡ ηB(k+ 1). We have not yet reached the bar, and may step in any direction
to approach it. Applyz, fixingy ∈ N; then, we want to apply our inductive hypothesis
at ηB(k). It suffices to show that for anyα  〈〉, we have ~u_y A α [k+ 1+ |~u|] ∈ Q;
this follows fromP(y :: α), and from the fact that ~u_y A α = ~u A y :: α.
Case b ≡ z(b ′). Applyz, fixingy ∈ N; apply the inductive hypothesis atb ′(y). Now,
fixingα  〈〉, it suffices to show that ~u_y A α [b ′(y) B α+ 1+ |~u|] ∈ Q. ByP(y ::
α), we have ~u A y :: α [b ′(y) B α+ |~u|] ∈ Q; because ~u A y :: α = ~u_y A α, we
only have to show that we will remain in Q if we take one more element from the
composite choice sequence. But this is precisely what it means forQ to be monotone,
and so we are done.
5 Formalization in Agda
This paper amounts to an “unformalization” of a completely formal development1 in
the Agda proof assistant [17], using Darin Morrison’s alternative Agda basis library [16].
We owe a lot to Mart´ın Escardo´’s original formalizations of effectful forcing in Agda [7].
It is important to emphasize that the proof has been completely effected within the in-
tensional dialect of Martin-Lo¨f’s Constructive Type Theory as implemented in Agda,
without postulating any further principles.
6 Related Work
Schwichtenberg’s closure theorem In 1979, Schwichtenberg proved an even stronger
result than what we have proved here, namely that for any closed SystemT term which
codes a bar of type 0 and 1, the bar recursor can already be defined in SystemT [22]. In
1The full development is available here: https://github.com/jonsterling/
agda-effectful-forcing
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more recent work, Oliva and Steila give an elegant and direct proof of Schwichtenberg’s
result [18].
It should be possible to replicate this result in our setting by using Church encod-
ings of Escardo´ dialogues, which can easily be defined in SystemT. Escardo´ has used
this technique to exhibit the modulus of continuity of a SystemT functional as a pro-
gram in SystemT [7].
Forcing in type theory Aside from Escardo´, whose results we have discussed in de-
tail already, there has been a great deal of work related to (traditional) forcing in type
theory over the past several years. Coquand and Jaber have combined forcing with
realizability to obtain a version of type theory which validates the uniform continuity
of functionals on the Cantor space [4]; Coquand and Mannaa have also used a similar
technique to demonstrate the independence of Markov’s Principle from dependent
type theory [5].
Howe’s computational open-endedness In his remarkable paper, On Computational
Open-Endedness in Martin-Lo¨f’s Type Theory [12], Douglas Howe demonstrated that the
computation systems of Martin-Lo¨f-style type theories may be extended with infini-
tary rules, for instance, to endow type theory with oracles or classical / set-theoretic
functions, Brouwerian free choice sequences, etc.
Howe’s result is crucial for justifying the adequacy of Type Theory as a semi-formal
theory of constructions in which to realize Brouwer’s vision of mathematical activity,
in which the (at least) potential existence of non-constructive (non-algorithmic) oper-
ations is absolutely essential (see [8, 9, 10]).
Bar induction in Nuprl A weak form of the bar induction principle has been added
as a basic axiom in Nuprl’s proof theory; consequently, via a bootstrapping technique,
stronger forms of the bar principle are also made to hold in Nuprl, including both the
monotone and decidable bar principles [19, 21]. As a result, the Fan Theorem is true in
Nuprl, and has been used to establish the uniform continuity of all functionals on the
Cantor spread [20].
Traditionally, the soundness of Nuprl’s proof theory with respect to its partial equiv-
alence relation semantics has been established by completely constructive means. With
the addition of the bar induction principle, however, Nuprl’s semantics must be per-
formed in a classical metatheory. We are curious whether the technique used here can
be extended to a language that supports universal computation, like Nuprl; if so, this
may provide a path toward recovering the constructive character of Nuprl’s semantics.
In order to prove the validity of their bar induction rule, all (classical) sequences of
numerals have been added directly to Nuprl’s computation system; this is essentially
an iteration of what has been done in the present work, and by Escardo´ [7], and is justi-
fied by Howe’s open-endedness result [12]. It corresponds to the well-known fact that
the bar principle cannot hold if functions are restricted to the computable (recursive,
algorithmic) operations [23].
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7 What is the significance of SystemT?
The most common way to construct a model of a formal system in which some non-
constructive principle holds is to use sheaf semantics, in which types are interpreted
as sheaves on a topological space (in our case, the Baire spaceB , NN), and predicates
are interpreted as subsheaves of the types which form their range of significance.2
This is the semantical technique to which Escardo´’s effectful forcing is the syntactic ana-
logue.
When considering our proof in context, it is reasonable to ask what the specific role
of SystemTwas, as opposed to some other theory of constructions (possibly incorpo-
rating general recursion and other computational effects). Our view is that the an-
swer to these questions comes down essentially to the fact that programs in SystemT
code their own termination proofs, and what’s more, these termination arguments
are valid in any constructive metatheory, including those in which the bar principle is
refuted.
As a result, it is possible to consider quite concretely the extension of System T
with bar induction, by simply adding an operator to the language which denotes the
generic point which we defined in Section 4.3, generic ∈ V 〈〈nat→ nat〉〉. What about
using PCF as a theory of constructions—or, more generally, interpreting predicates as
relations defined over a partial programming language as is done in Martin-Lo¨f’s type
theory [14, 1]?
Here the question becomes more complicated, since such languages can already
code any computationally effective principle, including bar recursion and Markov’s
principle, which are both represented by unbounded search. Thus the matter which
must be dealt with shifts from definability to totality, which once again depends entirely
on the characteristics of the ambient metatheory. To force the bar recursor to be total
a suitable domain (which is the same as to say that it shall realize the bar induction
principle), then, we must ensure that the judgment T terminates is interpreted in a
suitable metatheory or judgmental apparatus in which the bar principle already holds.
The above amounts to defining the ambient judgmental apparatus of our theory
of constructions using sheaf semantics: in particular, the derivations that a particular
program realizes a predicate will form a sheaf on the Baire space, and the inductive
character of these derivations which is induced by the locality laws for sheaves will
enable us to extract a suitable Escardo´ dialogue, which can then be processed into a
Brouwerian dialogue in the way that we have described in Section 4.1, Figure 10.
This is in essence the technique used to construct a model of Martin-Lo¨f’s Type
Theory which refutes Markov’s principle in [5], though the authors do not explain fully
the relationship with standard sheaf semantics. This method can also be seen as a di-
rect formalization and modernization of Brouwer’s “creating subject arguments” [6].
In future work, we intend to use this method to construct an interpretation of
Martin-Lo¨f’s type theory in which Brouwer’s Thesis is upheld on a purely constructive
basis, an improvement on the current state of affairs in Nuprl [19, 21].
2Sheaf-theoretic forcing is not only useful for validating Brouwerian principles; if one has committed
to a constructive ambient metatheory, classical principles can be interpreted by forcing over the double-
negation topology, as explained in [13].
18
Acknowledgements
Thanks to Thierry Coquand, Mart´ın Escardo´, Mark van Atten, Bob Harper, Mark Bick-
ford and Bob Constable for helpful conversations about the Bar Theorem; thanks to
Vincent Rahli for reading an earlier draft of this paper and suggesting a significant
simplification of the apparatus.
References
[1] R. L. Constable, S. F. Allen, H. M. Bromley, W. R. Cleaveland, J. F. Cremer, R. W.
Harper, D. J. Howe, T. B. Knoblock, N. P. Mendler, P. Panangaden, J. T. Sasaki,
and S. F. Smith. Implementing Mathematics with the Nuprl Proof Development System.
Prentice-Hall, Inc., Upper Saddle River, NJ, USA, 1986. 18
[2] T. Coquand. About Brouwer’s fan theorem. Revue Internationale de Philosophie,
58(230 (4)):483–489, 2004. 1
[3] T. Coquand. Personal correspondence, January 2016. 1
[4] T. Coquand and G. Jaber. A computational interpretation of forcing in type the-
ory. In P. Dybjer, S. Lindstrm, E. Palmgren, and G. Sundholm, editors, Epistemol-
ogy versus Ontology, volume 27 of Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, pages
203–213. Springer Netherlands, 2012. 17
[5] T. Coquand and B. Mannaa. The independence of Markov’s principle in type the-
ory. Accepted to Formal Structures for Computation and Deduction, 2016. 17,
18
[6] M. Dummett. Elements of intuitionism, volume 39 of Oxford Logic Guides. The
Clarendon Press Oxford University Press, New York, second edition, 2000. 5,
6, 12, 18
[7] M. Escardo´. Continuity of Go¨del’s System T definable functionals via ef-
fectful forcing. Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science, 298:119–141,
2013. Agda development: http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mhe/dialogue/
dialogue-lambda.html. 1, 7, 9, 11, 16, 17
[8] M. P. Fourman. Notions of choice sequence. In D. van Dalen and A. Troelstra,
editors, L.E.J. Brouwer Centenary Symposium, pages 91–105. North-Holland, 1982.
17
[9] M. P. Fourman. Continuous Truth I: Non-constructive objects. In G. L. G. Lolli
and A. Marcja, editors, Logic Colloquium ’82, volume 112 of Studies in Logic and the
Foundations of Mathematics, pages 161 – 180. Elsevier, 1984. 17
[10] M. P. Fourman. Continuous Truth II: Reflections. In L. Libkin, U. Kohlenbach,
and R. de Queiroz, editors, Logic, Language, Information, and Computation: 20th
International Workshop, WoLLIC 2013, Darmstadt, Germany, August 20-23, 2013. Pro-
ceedings, pages 153–167, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2013. Springer Berlin Heidelberg. 17
19
[11] K. Go¨del. U¨ber eine bisher noch nicht benu¨tzte Erweiterung des finiten Stand-
punktes. Dialectica, 12(3-4):280–287, 1958. 6
[12] D. Howe. On computational open-endedness in Martin-Lo¨f’s type theory. In Logic
in Computer Science, 1991. LICS ’91., Proceedings of Sixth Annual IEEE Symposium on,
pages 162–172, July 1991. 17
[13] S. Mac Lane and I. Moerdijk. Sheaves in geometry and logic : a first introduction to
topos theory. Universitext. Springer, New York, 1992. 18
[14] P. Martin-Lo¨f. Intuitionistic type theory, volume 1 of Studies in Proof Theory. Bib-
liopolis, 1984. 18
[15] P. Martin-Lo¨f. Truth of a proposition, evidence of a judgement, validity of a proof.
Synthese, 73(3):407–420, 1987. 5
[16] D. Morrison. agda-prelude: A simple prelude for Agda. https://github.
com/freebroccolo/agda-prelude, 2016. 16
[17] U. Norell. Dependently typed programming in agda. In Proceedings of the 4th
International Workshop on Types in Language Design and Implementation, TLDI ’09,
pages 1–2, New York, NY, USA, 2009. ACM. 1, 16
[18] P. Oliva and S. Steila. A direct proof of Schwichtenberg’s bar recursion closure
theorem. Under review, 2016. 17
[19] V. Rahli and M. Bickford. Coq as a metatheory for Nuprl with bar induction. In
Continuity, Computability, Constructivity – From Logic to Algorithms, 2015. 17, 18
[20] V. Rahli and M. Bickford. A nominal exploration of Intuitionism. In Proceedings
of the 5th ACM SIGPLAN Conference on Certified Programs and Proofs, CPP 2016, pages
130–141, New York, NY, USA, 2016. ACM. 17
[21] V. Rahli, M. Bickford, and R. Constable. A story of bar induction in Nuprl. http:
//www.nuprl.org/html/Nuprl2Coq/, 2016. 17, 18
[22] H. Schwichtenberg. On bar recursion of types 0 and 1. Journal of Symbolic Logic,
44(3):325f329, Sep 1979. 1, 16
[23] A. Troelstra and van Dalen, Dirk. Constructivism in mathematics: an introduction.
Volume I. Studies in logic and the foundations of mathematics. North-Holland,
Amsterdam, New-York, Oxford, 1988. 17
[24] M. van Atten. On Brouwer. Wadsworth Philosophers Series. Thomp-
son/Wadsworth, Toronto, Canada, 2004. 12
20
